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Abstract
Economists and Political scientists have suggested for a long time that democ-
racy and the environment are linked. What they did not analyze in detail is if
the way in which politicians are elected influences the environment as well. The
scope of this paper is to fill this gap. Using high quality data on a cross sec-
tion of countries, coming from previous studies, we find strong results suggesting
that politicians in majoritarian systems are less interested in environmental com-
mitments than those in proportional representations. The consequence is that
environmental commitments are lower in the former system than in the latter.
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1 Introduction
Economists and political scientists have suggested that the environment and politics
(and in particular democracy) are linked, since the sixties. At that time, authors such as
Hardin [4] expressed their concern on whether democracy could help solve environmental
problems. Even if a consensus about a positive correlation between the two does not
exist (see [3]), most of the literature tends nevertheless to go in this direction. In 1995,
Payne proposed a very elegant explanation for this relationship basing his reasoning
on four important concepts of democracy namely the freedom of press, the freedom of
speech, the freedom of association and the freedom of vote. His idea is that the freedom
of press allows the mass media to inform people on environmental problems; the freedom
of speech allows the people to express their fears while the freedom of association allows
them to create organizations to lobby for the respect of their environmental preferences.
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Finally the freedom of vote allows people to pressure politicians to act in accordance
with their desire through elections.
Given these liberties allowed by democracies but not by autocracies, he concludes
that democracies should observe higher commitments towards environmental agree-
ments than autocracies. In this paper, the last point of his analysis, the freedom of
vote, has a particular importance. Even if we totally agree with the fact that the first
necessary condition for an electoral system to be effective in monitoring politicians is
democracy, we are also convinced that very important discrepancies exist among dif-
ferent electoral systems and that by analyzing only an authoritarian versus democratic
dichotomy might bring to the neglect of important features. Our intuition is that elec-
toral systems might affect unequally the decisions over environmental commitments
due to the specific strategic behavior of politicians they imply. The basic idea is that
under each system, there is a conflict entailed by policies among groups of voters, both
between voters and politicians and among different politicians [9]. As a result, while
maximizing their utility, politicians choose the policy to adopt under the constraint of
the electoral rule. The outcome is that different systems are associated with unequal
policies.
Electoral systems are characterized by several features such as the electoral rule for
assigning seats in the parliament, the separation of powers between the legislative and
the executive branch and the maintenance of power of the chief of the executive. In this
paper, we concentrate only on the effects the electoral rule for electing the parliament1
has on the environment and leave the other features for future research. As stated
by Persson and Tabellini [10], electoral rules used in legislative elections around the
world differ in several dimensions. The most important difference highlighted by polit-
ical scientists lies between the district size and the electoral formula. The district size
represents the number of seats allocated in each district while the electoral formula de-
termines how votes are translated into seats. With these two dimensions, we can group
all the countries in two main groups: the majoritarian and the proportional representa-
tion systems. Single seat constituencies characterize the majoritarian countries where
the single seat is attributed either to the candidate that received the highest number
of votes (plurality) or the candidate that received at least 50% of the votes (majority).
Multi-seat constituency characterizes the proportional representation countries where
the seats are allocated proportionally to the share of votes received by each party. In
many countries the system is mixed which means that some seats are distributed ac-
cording to the proportional rule while others by the majoritarian rule. In this paper, we
define a country as being majoritarian if more than 50% of the seats of the parliament
are filled following the majority rule. Otherwise, it is coded as proportional.
As we will explain in detail in the next section, we expect politicians to favor local in-
terests under majoritarian systems while we expect them to favor broad programs under
the proportional representation rule. For this reason, we suppose that environmental
commitments will not be considered as an interesting political platform in majoritarian
systems while they will be one in proportional systems. The effect on international en-
vironmental commitments is straightforward. To test for this hypothesis, the structure
1In fact the lower house of the Parliament.
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of the paper is the following: after this short introduction, in section two, we present
the theoretical predictions of the effects of the electoral system on environmental com-
mitments. In the third section we present the data and the methodology we use. In the
fourth we present our major findings and we conclude in the fifth.
2 Theoretical Predictions
The theoretical link between electoral systems and environmental commitments is latent
in the models used in the political economics literature. We will analyze this in details
later in the section but, before, it is important to look at some stylized facts linking these
two features. Note that electoral systems have a meaning only in countries where voters
can effectively express their preference. For this reason we will only consider countries
where this condition is satisfied and can thus be seen as sufficiently democratic. In the
methodological section, we will explain this concept in detail as well as we will explain
the selection procedure we used to decide which country should be considered in the
study. For the moment, it is sufficient to keep in mind that the countries that we consider
here are countries where elections of the parliament are held without political constraints
and where the elected candidate is represented in the parliament in accordance with
the votes received and the electoral rule in application.
The most intuitive way of quantifying environmental commitments is to look at the
number of signed and ratified Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEA). When we
look at some descriptive statistics over the number of signed or ratified MEAs we see
that, apparently, majoritarian systems do seem to have higher commitments towards
the environment. For example, we see that, in average, countries that have a majori-
tarian system, sign about 13.19 treaties against 16.3 for those having a proportional
representation system. A test of comparison of means2 rejects strongly (p-value=0.004)
the assumption that these means are equals. Considering the fact that this measure
might suffer from the excessive influence of some outliers, it is interesting to calculate
the median number of signed MEAs and run a test of comparison of medians. Here
again, we see that majoritarian systems seem to have much lower environmental com-
mitments than proportional representations. The median number of signed treaties
is 15 for proportional representations and 11 for majoritarian systems. The test of
comparison of medians strongly rejects the null of equality (P-value=0.002)3.
Neumayer [7] states clearly that among all the potential MEAs, only some could
be considered as interesting in analyzing the environmental commitments since most
of them are either regional agreements or have an almost universal membership that
can be joined without any cost. For this reason, he searched for the MEAs that are
not regional and do not have a zero cost universal membership. He found that only
four MEAs could be consider as satisfying these conditions. These MEAs are: the
Kyoto protocol on the reduction of CO2 emissions, the Rotterdam Protocol on trade
in hazardous chemicals and pesticides, the Cartagena Biosafety protocol on biosafety
2Allowing for unequal variances.
3Continuity corrected.
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and genetically modified organisms and the Copenhagen amendment on the Montreal
protocol on ozone layer depletion. Following his work, we analyze some descriptive
statistics on these four agreements.
When we look at the signatories of the Kyoto protocol, we see that among the 60
proportional systems considered here, 30% did not sign the protocol while 70% did.
Among the 49 majoritarian systems, 45% did not sign the treaty while 55% did sign.
When we look at the Rotterdam Protocol, we see that among the proportional democ-
racies 60% signed the treaty while among the majoritarian systems, only 39% signed the
treaty. For the Cartagena Biosafety protocol, 68% of the proportional systems signed
the treaty against 53% for majoritarian. Finally, for the Copenhagen amendment on the
Montreal protocol, we observe that 78% of the proportional systems signed the treaty
against 69% of the majoritarian systems. When we aggregate the four MEAs , we can
present a summary table.
#Treaties Proportional Majoritarian
Signed Representations Systems
0 8 10
1 10 22
2 15 31
3 33.5 25
4 33.5 12
Table 1: Number of selected MEA Signed,% by System
From this table we see that about 67% of the proportional representations signed at
least 3 treaties against 37 % for the majoritarian systems. For majoritarian countries,
much more observations are in the middle-lower part of the distribution.
Looking at the political economics literature, it seems evident that Downsian models
of political behavior can help explaining these differences. We very briefly summarize
the main ideas here.
When we consider the electoral rule, and as stated briefly above, to differentiate
between majoritarian and proportional systems, two features should be stressed: the
district size and the electoral formula. By district size, we mean the number of repre-
sentatives elected in each district, whereas the electoral formula determines how votes
are translated into seats. To determine the predicted effects of the first characteristic
on environmental commitments, we can rely on Persson and Tabellini [9], who model
a two party electoral competition and show that small districts, which are typical of
majoritarian systems, are associated with locally targeted policies. This is because
competition between politicians is concentrated in pivotal districts. When the districts
are large, these authors predict that the electoral competition will be diffused and par-
ties will seek support from broad coalitions of voters. Policies are thus concentrated
on broad programs. Milesi-Ferretti et al. [6] reach similar conclusions with a differ-
ent model. In their study, they start with the hypothesis that legislators represent
geographically determined groups in small districts whereas in large districts they rep-
resent socio-economic groups. This results in local targeted policies in countries where
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the majority rule prevails, and to more broad policies in countries characterized by the
proportional rule. Regarding the predictions associated to the second characteristic of
the electoral rule (the electoral formula), Persson and Tabellini [9] again, with the same
model described above, show that in majoritarian systems, where politicians need 50%
of the votes in 50% of the districts to get to power, policies will be concentrated on
narrow geographically determined programs (to please about the 25% of the population
located in pivotal districts, allowing them to win the elections) while under propor-
tional representations, where 50% of the total votes not geographically determined are
required, spending will be oriented towards broad policies (to please 50% of the vot-
ers). The effect predicted with the first electoral rule characteristic is thus strengthened
by the second. Given these results, it seems evident that environmental commitments
might be of secondary interest for politicians in majoritarian systems since they cannot
be locally targeted. They are thus of no use as a political platform for winning the
elections. At the opposite, in proportional systems, these policies might please a broad
part of the population and can thus be seen as interesting politically.
3 The Data and the Methodology
3.1 The Data
As stated by Neumayer [7], the empirical literature linking political systems and environ-
ment, remained mainly concentrated in environmental outcomes and not environmental
commitments. The author criticizes strongly this approach. To articulate his critique
he studies the work of Midlarsky [5] on CO2 emission and of Torras and Boyce [11]
and Barret and Graddy [1] on soil erosion. He gets to the conclusions that the effective
reduction of both the CO2 emission and the soil erosion as described in the papers
by Midlarski, Torras and Boyce and Barret and Grady, depend on a huge number of
factors other than politics. For this reason it is extremely difficult to quantify the effect
politics have on these environmental hazards. He concludes that the only thing that can
be effectively measured is how politics affect the adoption of international agreements.
Once adopted, the results of such agreements might take a long time before they can
be observed and can be heavily influenced by exogenous factors. Thus, by taking the
environmental outcomes as a measure of the degree of interest politicians give to the
environment might be misleading. He suggests then to solely concentrate on the envi-
ronmental treaty commitments of the countries. The first proxy variables we think of,
are the total number of signed and/or ratified treaties which are available in the World
Fact Book, CIA [2]. We will use them in the empirical part but, as we will see in the
next paragraph, these proxies suffer of severe limitations.
Neumayer [7] proposes other variables that might proxy the international commit-
ment on environmental issues: the signing and ratification of some specific Multilateral
Environment Agreements (MEA), the number of memberships in environmental inter-
governmental organizations (EIO), the extent to which reporting requirements for the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES)
are met, the percentage of country land area under protection status, the existence of a
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National Council on Sustainable Development (NCSD) and the availability of environ-
mentally relevant information. In this paper, in addition to the number of MEAs signed
or ratified, we will concentrate our analysis only on the first two variables proposed by
Neumayer [7] since we think that these are the only two that can effectively proxy the
environmental commitments of governments. The CITES variable is supposed to proxy
the compliance with the requirement of the MEAs. It surely proxy the compliance for
the MEA on endangered species of fauna and flora but it is difficult to believe that
all the countries are equally concerned by the trade in endangered species of flora and
fauna and other environmental hazards such as soil erosion or CO2 emission. This lack
of generality of the variable makes us think that it is not a sufficient proxy for the
purpose of our study.
For the fourth variable considered by Neumayer, the percentage of land area un-
der protection status, we think that this variable suffers from the same weaknesses he
highlighted in CO2 emissions and soil erosion. In particular, this variable depends on
a plethora of exogenous factors that do not depend on politics, such as the size of the
country, the population density, the percentage of the land that is arable, the percent-
age of land occupied by mountains, the number of islands and so on. For this reason,
it is difficult to consider it as a variable that proxies the degree of commitment of the
government towards environment. The existence of a National Council of Sustainable
Development is not sufficient to be considered as a proxy for an environmental com-
mitment either, since it can only be seen as a nominal commitment. Given that the
correlation (at a cross-country level) between this variable and the first two is low (less
than 35%) we understand that in fact it doesn’t have a very strong effect on real com-
mitments. Finally, the availability of environmentally relevant information is more a
proxy of the efficiency in providing information of a country than anything else. For
this reason we do not think it is interesting here. For the two variables proposed by
Neumayer kept in this paper, we take our data from his database [7]. As explained pre-
viously, the data for the signing and ratification of specific Multilateral Environment
Agreements (MEA) come from a selection process among the more than 180 existing
treaties. A first criterion was that the MEA should be global and not regional. A sec-
ond one was that the treaty should not have a quasi-universal membership since these
treaties can often be joined without any cost incurred and cannot really proxy an envi-
ronmental commitment. Based on these criteria, the author selected four treaties: the
Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the Montreal Protocol on ozone layer depletion, the
Rotterdam Convention on trade in hazardous chemicals and pesticides and finally the
Cartagena Protocol on biodiversity and genetically modified organisms. These treaties
identify four extremely important components of the environment. In the empirical sec-
tion, four dummy variables will be considered to identify if countries signed each specific
treaty. These variables will be considered alone and jointly in a composite variable con-
structed as being the sum of the four. This composite variable can be considered as an
indicator for the degree of commitment to environment. A value of four associated to
a country means that this country is very concerned with environment while a value of
zero means that the country does not commit itself to environment at all. The data for
the participation in environment international organizations come from the WEF [12]
and the Yearbook of International Organizations [13].
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Apart from the environmental commitment proxies, that are our dependent vari-
ables, for our empirical analysis, we also need independent variables. The first impor-
tant one, is a variable identifying the electoral system.
When we look at the non-autocratic countries of the world, we see that there are
almost as many electoral systems as there are countries. Nevertheless, it is possible
to classify all of them into two main clusters: the family of majoritarian formulas and
the family of proportional formulas. By majoritarian formulas we mean rules such
that the elected representatives are those who have won a majority of votes in the
district for which they compete. On the opposite, proportional representations do not
concern individuals but parties4. Each party will be represented proportionally to the
percentage of votes received. The coding scheme is thus straightforward.
It might be argued that, in many countries, there is no single electoral rule and
some of the members of the parliament are elected by a majority rule and others by a
proportional rule. We decide to code an electoral rule as being majoritarian if more than
50% of the representatives have been elected under a majoritarian rule5. Otherwise,
the country is coded as being proportional. Note that we limit our coding scheme
to national elections and only for the lower house of the parliament because of the
theoretical predictions (see [9]).
The other independent variables considered here are control variables. Neumayer
[7] identified several that might have an impact on the environmental commitment of
a country. First, he considers the wealth of a country. He suggests that poor countries
might prioritize other issues than environment. For this reason, as he did, we control for
the gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power parity in 1998 US$. Second,
he suggests that important (or big) countries should be more environmentally commit-
ted than unimportant ones. Here again we take his data and control for the (log) of the
total population. Finally he also clearly showed that environmental commitments and
democracy are highly correlated. For this reason we control for a democracy indicator.
The author considers the possibility that different indicators of democracy might have
different meanings, which could influence the results. Given that our theory only has a
meaning where people effectively vote for representatives, our preference in the democ-
racy index goes to the Jaggers and Gurr Polity IV indicator6 that considers exactly this
component of democracy. To assure a consistency between our theoretical argument
and our empirical analysis, we only kept countries with a sufficiently high degree of
democracy as defined by Neumayer (polity variable7 superior to 0). Nevertheless to as-
sure consistency, we also compared our results with the freedom house indicator. When
we have a discrepancy between the two, we looked in the IPU parline database to check
if the last elections for the parliament have taken place in accordance with democracy8.
4Except for the Single Transferable Vote.
5Note that in Russia exactly 50% of the representatives are elected under each rule. It is thus coded
as being proportional since we do not have that more than 50% of the representatives are elected by
majority rule.
6Note that the results do not change much when we adopt another indicator of democracy.
7Ranging from -10 to 10.
8Note that since we are only interested in the selection process of the parliament, some countries
that might have very strong government but where elections are held democratically for selecting the
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The democracy indicator was thus used both to make a selection of our sample but
was also considered as an independent control variable in the regression. Finally, we
also controlled for some regional dummies identifying countries in Latin America, in
sub-Saharan Africa, and in Post Communist Transition countries9.
3.2 The Methodology
In our analysis, we run heteroskedasticity consistent regressions over three types of
dependent variables: count, binary and ordered. For the first type of data we use
a negative binomial model, for the binary dependent data we use a standard logit
model and for the ordered data, we use an order logit model. In all these models,
we correct for the fact that the observations are independent across groups (clusters)
but not necessarily independent within groups. The groups considered here are regions,
namely: Eastern Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Middle-East and North
Africa, Southern Asia, Western Europe, North America, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America. Since the coefficients of these regression models have no immediate meaning,
we calculate incidence rate ratios for the count model and marginal effects calculated
at the median for the others.
4 Results
In this section we start by presenting how the electoral rule influenced the adoption of
the four specific MEAs described above (independently or jointly) and the present how
it influences the number of signed or ratified treaties and the number of participation
in EIOs. In Table 2, we can see the results of the logit regression where the dependent
variable is a dummy coded equal to one if the country signed a specific environmental
agreement. The values presented are the marginal effects calculated at median10. Start-
ing with the famous Kyoto protocol, dealing with CO2 emissions, we find that there is
no statistical difference between majoritarian and proportional systems. For the other
agreements, namely the Copenhagen protocol on ozone layer depletion, the Rotterdam
convention on trade in hazardous chemicals and the Cartagena protocol on genetically
modified organisms, we see that systematically majoritarian systems are less keen to
sign the treaties. In terms of size of effect, we see that for these three last environmental
agreements, a median country11 in all the dimension having a majoritarian system with
respect to a similar country with a proportional representation election rule would have
a 10.6% lower probability of signing the Copenhagen amendment, a 28.4% lower prob-
ability of signing the Rotterdam convention and a 18.5% lower probability of signing
the Cartagena protocol.
parliament, are kept in the study.
9Note that we keep only these three regions to avoid loosing too many degrees of freedom. Never-
theless, controlling for more regions does not change the generality of the results.
10We decided to calculate the marginal effects at medians and not means since there are several
qualitative variables for which the mean has no direct meaning.
11Having a level of democracy of 8, a ln(GDP) of 8.67, a ln(Population) of 15.99 and not being
neither in Latin America nor in Sub-Saharan Africa or in a Transition country.
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Following the work of Neumayer, we then consider an ordered qualitative variable
that shows the degree of commitments to environmental agreements. This variable is
created by summing the dummy variables described here above. If a country has signed
all the above-mentioned agreements, the variables will be coded as equal to four. If it
signed none of them, it will be coded as equal to zero, and so on. We present in Table 3
the results of the ordered logit regression with this ordered variable as dependent, and
the same right hand side variables as described above. In the first column we present
the result of the regression, while in the successive, we present the marginal effects
calculated at a median value for each class of the dependent variable. Looking at the
results we see, from the sign of the majoritarian dummy, that it is much more likely
that majoritarian systems fall in the lower12 categories than in the higher. For example,
the probability that a majoritarian system falls in category one (no treaty signed) is
5% higher than a proportional. For the second category, it is 94% more likely while for
the third it is 16% more likely. For category 4 there is no difference between the two
systems, while for category 5, it is 22% less likely that a majoritarian system falls in
this category.
Kyoto Copenhagen Rotterdam Cartagena
Protocol Amendments Convention Protocol
Majoritarian System -0.021 -0.106∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗
(0.20) (2.66) (3.16) (3.54)
Democracy Index 0.015 -0.011∗ 0.004 0.003
(0.61) (1.66) (0.45) (0.78)
Ln(GDP) 0.187∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.155∗∗ -0.031
(1.90) (2.30) (1.96) (0.56)
Ln(Population) 0.017 -0.000 0.052∗ 0.030∗
(0.47) (0.00) (1.82) (1.69)
Transition Economies 0.043 -0.191∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(0.027) (2.37) (5.09) (3.75)
Latin America 0.107 -0.049 -0.108 -0.082
(0.66) (0.96) (1.19) (1.41)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.421 -0.082 0.094 -0.124
(1.66) (1.33) (0.68) (1.06)
Observations 99 99 99 99
Pseudo-R2 0.31 0.25 0.21 0.06
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% Marginal Effects calculated at Medians
Table 2: Logit Regression- Adhesion to environmental agreements
Even if we are convinced that these variables are very good proxies for the en-
vironmental commitments, it might be argued that a large number of environmental
agreements are not considered in our analysis and that we only concentrate our study
on four specific characteristics of the environment. For this reason, following again
Neumayer, we consider an additional one. This variable is the number of memberships
12Not many treaties signed.
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Marginal Effects
Regression
Results #1 #2 #3 #4 #5
Majoritarian System -1.332∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.942∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ -0.082 -0.220∗∗∗
(3.92) (2.19) (5.68) (2.77) (1.11) (2.72)
Democracy Index -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Ln(GDP) 1.036∗∗ -0.019 -0.044 -0.121∗∗ -0.048 0.232∗∗∗
(2.07) (0.96) (1.20) (1.70) (0.75) (2.74)
Ln(Population) 0.246 -0.004 -0.010 -0.029∗∗ -0.011 0.055
(1.47) (1.33) (1.27) (1.37) (0.51) (1.30)
Transition Economies -1.090∗∗ 0.035 0.050∗∗ 0.135∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.192∗
(2.34) (4.76) (2.54) (2.28) (2.45) (1.87)
Latin America 0.050 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 0.011
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.174 0.003 0.008 0.021 0.006 -0.038
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18)
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99
Pseudo-R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%
Table 3: Ordered Logit Regression-Adhesion to Environmental Agreements
in environmental intergovernmental organizations. Finally we also consider the number
of signed or ratified environment13- international agreements. The results of the nega-
tive binomial regressions are presented in Table 4. Note that to have a straightforward
reading of the coefficients, we present the Incidence Rate Ratios in Table 5. As we
can see in Table 4, the results are: first, being a majoritarian system, decreases the
expected number of participation in Environmental Intergovernmental Organizations
by about 18.6% =(0.81414-1)*100, holding other variables constant. Second, being a
majoritarian system, decreases the expected number of ratified treaties by about 11.9%
and finally, being a majoritarian system decreases the expected number of signed or
ratified treaties by about 13.5%.
It might be argued that in our regression we do not capture the system effect but
the colonial origin (in particular the British one). For this reason we checked if our
results would be affected by the inclusion of a dummy identifying countries that gained
independence from the United Kingdom or by one of its former colonies. The generality
of the results remain the same after the inclusion of this variable. Similarly, we also
considered the possibility that the inclusion of a regime type15 variable might affect the
13We consider here two variables. A first one that counts the number of signed and ratified treaties
and a second one with signed treaties even if not necessarily ratified.
140.814 is the Incidence Rate Ratio associated to the majoritarian dummy coefficient. It means that
majoritarian systems have an expected number of participation equal approximately to the 81.4% of
the proportional systems
15By regime type we mean that the country is Presidential, Parliamentary of Mixed Presidential
Parliamentary.
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Environmental Signed or Ratified
Intergovernmental Ratified Treaties Treaties
Organizations
Majoritarian System -0.205∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗
(4.46) (2.92) (3.20)
Democracy Index 0.009∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(1.64) (2.33) (2.52)
Ln(GDP) 0.235∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(3.83) (5.23) (5.73)
Ln(Population) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(7.18) (4.32) (4.55)
Transition Economies -0.417∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗ -0.086∗
(5.55) (2.37) (1.93)
Latin America -0.173∗∗ -0.053 -0.083∗
(2.22) (1.03) (1.83)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.009 0.001 -0.035
(0.07) (0.01) (0.46)
Observations 91 98 98
Pseudo-R2 0.2 0.17 0.19
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%
Table 4: Negative Binomial, Number of signed treaties and participation in EIOs.
results. By including this variable, the generality of the results remain again unchanged.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to understand if there might be a link between the strategic
behavior of politicians, which depends on the electoral system, and environmental com-
mitments. In particular, we wanted to understand if majoritarian systems are less prone
to participate in environmental related agreements than proportional representations.
The theoretical predictions came from the political economics literature where several
authors have shown that politicians are interested in locally targetable policies in ma-
joritarian systems while they prefer broad policies in proportional systems for electoral
purposes. Given that environmental policies can by no mean be targeted locally, our
intuition was that it would not be considered as an interesting electoral platform to win
the elections in majoritarian systems while it would be one in proportional systems.
For this reason, majoritarian system should be less committed to environmental poli-
cies than proportional representation. We tested for this idea using several proxies and
we got to the strong conclusion that apparently yes, there is a difference in the envi-
ronmental commitments of a country depending on the electoral rule. In particular we
found that majoritarian systems are less prone to sign such treaties than proportional
representations. Even if this is a first step and a further analysis might be interesting to
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find additional results, we believe that these results are interesting and might help im-
prove our knowledge on the origins of the difference between countries in environmental
commitments.
Environmental Signed or
Intergovernmental Ratified Ratified
Organisations Treaties Treaties
Majoritarian System 0.814∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗
(4.46) (2.92) (3.20)
Democracy Index 1.009∗ 1.019∗∗ 1.016∗∗
(1.64) (2.33) (2.52)
Ln(GDP) 1.265∗∗∗ 1.230∗∗∗ 1.234∗∗∗
(3.83) (5.23) (5.73)
Ln(Population) 1.135∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗
(7.18) (4.32) (4.55)
Transition Economies 0.659∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗ 0.917∗
(5.55) (2.37) (1.93)
Latin America 0.841∗∗ 0.949 0.921∗
(2.22) (1.03) (1.83)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.991 1.001 0.966
(0.07) (0.01) (0.46)
Observations 91 98 98
Pseudo-R2 0.2 0.17 0.19
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%
Table 5: Negative Binomial, Number of signed treaties and participation in EIO’s.
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